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Incentives and Wage Rigidity
ABSTRACT
With the growth of the literature on incentive compensation has come the
belief by some that incentive pay may be less rigid than pay that is not
designed to effect incentives. Some have gone so far as to argue that this may
explain differences in unemployment rates across countries. it is shown that
there is no direct link between incentives and wage rigidity. Many compensation
schemes that provide incentives have the reverse effect: That is, they tend to
make wages more rigid than would be the case were incentives not an issue at
all. This paper explores the relationship between wage rigidity and the
provision of incentives in a variety of circumstances.
Edward P. Lazear
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University of Chicago
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
312—962—7464The notion that compensation may be structured to affect worker productiv-
ity is not new. Traditionally, piece rates have been the most common form of
incentive pay. Recently, more elaborate bonus systems have begun to creep into
the Pmerican labor scene. Concurrent with the growth of creative compensation
practices has been the development of a literature that describes the incentive
effects which are associated with existing or hypothetical payment schemes.1
A similar, but distinct literature has considered wage rigidity that
results when labor contracts are used as an alternative to a spot market. Most
of the work in this literature centers around the idea that workers want to
insure themselves against a variable wage stream. Others concentrate on the
nature of contracts when information is asymmetric——either the worker or firm
(or both) has information to which the other party is not privy.2
This essay examines incentive arrangements to determine whether they
contribute wage rigidity to an economy. Specifically, the attempt by employers
to induce workers to produce efficiently may change the variability of wages
over the business cycle, life cycle and across individuals. International
comparisons have revealed differences in wage flexibility across countries .Can
these differences be explained by the extent to which the countries use
incentive compensation? c,turningit around, are measured "business cycle"
variations in wages mere reflections of worker incentive schemes?
The literature is extensive. me of the more frequently citedpapers
are Ross (1983), Becker and Stigler (1984), Stiglitz (1975), Lazear (1979),
Fama (1980), and Holmstrom (1982).
literature has mushroomed over the past five years •Smeof the
more important or more recent papers are Baily (1974), Azariadis (1975), Green
and Honkapohja (1981), Green and Yahn (1981), Grossman and Hart (1981), Hall
and Lilien (1979), and Hall and Lazear (1984).
3Gordon (1982) found that the variability ofwages in Japan exceeds that
in the United States. Although little evidence exists, much has been made of
the widespread nature of the Japanese bonus system.—2—
The conclusion is that there is no simple relation of incentives to wage
flexibility. me incentive contracts add wage variance and reduce inflexi-
bility. Others have the opposite effect. After rigidity is defined, the
approach is to "prove by counterexample,'t discussing a number of incentive
schemes. Although the list is by no means exhaustive, it covers most of the
important ones and provides enough variety to demonstrate that there exists no
clear link between incentive provision and wage rigidity.
I. Definition of Rigid Wages
In order to obtain a concise definition of rigid wages, it is useful to
start with a simple model. Consider the simplest technology zhere output,
is the sum of effort, u, and luck, e:
(1) q=u+e
Assume initially that the variance of e is zero so that luck is not a
factor. This is relaxed below.
c*tput sells at price V so that the firm's profit function is
Profit =Vq—Y
where Y is the compensation of labor, the only factor of production. In a
world of competitive factor and product markets, the zero profit constraint must
hold so that
(2) Y=Vq
Wage rigidity is defined relative to what would occur in a spot market.
There are two variables that are of interest. thanges in V may occur over
business cycles or may reflect secular effects on the value of output. anges
in u can be thought of as differences across individuals with respect to work
efficiency or distaste for effort exertion.
In a spot market with full information, equations (1) and (2) imply that
(3) a. =u+V(u/3V)
b.aY/u =V—3—
Equation (3a,b) serves as the criterion against which results are compared to
determine wage rigidity.
II. Fixed Effort and Variable Effort
Before considering any specific incentive scheme, it is useful to point out
that the ability to vary effort contributes income variation to an economy, even
if workers are homogeneous. To see this, examine (3a). There are two terms on
the right—hand side. When the price of output changes, income changes because
each unit of effort is now more valuable (captured by the u term), but also
because the optimal level of effort changes (reflected in the Vu/aV term).
Appropriately, wages are more variable in a world where effort is not supplied
perfectly elastically.
Let us not take as given that workers adjust effort appropriately. After
all, if no restrictions were placed on workers, and if income Y were totally
independent of the level of effort, workers would choose to perform at the
lowest possible level •Theworker wants to choose u so as to maximize
utility, assumed to be given as
(4) Max Y(u)-C(u)
U
where Y(u) is the income function that he faces (it may depend directly on
q and only indirectly on u) and where C(u) is the cost of effort
function. The first—order condition for an optimum is the standard
(4a) Y'(u) =C'(u)
If q can be observed perfectly, then the first best solution can be
achieved by paying a "piece rate," i.e., letting y =Vq=Vu.The pure piece
rate is virtually synonymous with a spot market in this context, so it is not
surprising that differentiation of the piece rate income function duplicates
equations (3a,b).—4—
III. Imperfect Observability of citput
Few production environments lend themselves to costless and perfect
measurement. Although the output of a salesman is measured easily, that of a
vice president of finance is not. Firms often adapt to these difficulties by
using some kind of sampling mechanism that requires only a periodic check of
part of the worker's output. Without attempting to write down the optimal
sampling rule, let us merely state that one possible incentive device is to
sample the worker's output with some (optimally chosen) probability p. If the
worker's output is not audited, then he receives one wage, W(V), specified in
advance and potentially a function of V. If the worker is audited, then he is
paidS(q, V) .
Itis trivial to show that a first best wage scheme is tohave W(V) =0
andS(V, q) =Vq/pso that Y(u) =pVq/p =Vq=Vu.M incentive scheme of
this sort introduces cross—sectional wage variability where none would exist
were output observed costlessly or were effort levels given exogenously. Sup-
pose that all individuals have the same C(u) function. Huation (4a) ensures
that they all select the same level of u. But incomes will vary: 1 —pof the
individuals receive W(V) =0in income and p of the individuals receive
Vu/p. If a piece rate with 100% sampling were employed, then all workers would
receive Vu. 9 additional wage variation is a result. (W(V) =0should be
interpreted as the amount produced at the minimum observable effort level.)
Over the business cycle, changes in the price of the product are reflected
perfectly in the average wage across workers. But (1 —p)of the workers
receive W(V) =0find that their wages are independent of the changes in
product price whereas p of the workers find that their wage is especially
sensitive to changes in product price. cmpare aY/V =(1/p)(u+ V u/v)
4Becker (1968) and Becker and Stigler (1974) were among the first to
consider these probabilistic incentive schemes.—5—
with equation (3a) •Ifp is small, most workers find that their wages are
much more rigid than they would be in a world of exogenous effort with perfect
information.
The additional variance that is associated with this particular incentive
scheme is not a necessary consequence of either imperfect observability or of
the desire to use an incentive compensation structure. For example, in this
simple case, there is another first best compensation scheme that mimics a
perfect information spot market exactly. Suppose that the worker is told that
he will receive Vu if u >u*,but will be penalized some amount X if it is
detected that u has fallen below u. For any given p, there is a suffic-
iently large X such that workers always choose to product at u =u.Under
these circumstances, each worker's wage is always Vu, no cross—sectional vari-
ation in wages is introduced by this incentive plan, and (3a) and (3b) hold
exactly for all workers so no additional rigidity is imposed. The point is that
ensuring that appropriate incentive mechanisms are present does not imply that
additional wage variation is introduced. Below, it will be shown that incentive
wage schemes can actually reduce the amount of variation in an economy. First,
it is useful to consider incentive schemes that employ the fact that workers are
generally with the firm for more than one period.
IV. Life—Cycle Thcentive rvices
A number of authors have considered how age—earnings profiles can be
altered in order to provide incentive effects.6 The nature of the imperfect
observability of output usually takes a somewhat different form here. Suppose
5This is the solution in Becker [1968] and Becker and Sigler [1974)•It
is best understood in the life cycle context and is spelled out in more detail
below.
6See tazear (1979, 1981), rmichael (1981), apiro and Stiglitz (1982),
and Kuhn (1982).—6—
that work takes place in two periods, but that output is not observed until the
end of the period, and then only imperfectly, characterized for current purposes
by occurring with probability p. All that is necessary, it turns out, is that
one can observe that u <u(or that q < q*) the exact magnitude of the
deviation being irrelevant.
cie possible scheme that achieves a first best solution is to pay a wage
W0 in period zero and w1 in period 1 if outputin period zero was not
observed to have fallen below q*• If output in period zero is observed to have
fallen below q*, then the worker is terminated and is not permitted to work
during period 1. For simplicity, assume that the discount rate is zero and that
the alternative use of time in period 1 is zero. Then
W1 =c(u*)/p+x
(5) * * * W0Ji,-W1=Vu-C(u)/p-x
will ensure that a first best equilibrium is attained for any x > 0.
To see this, note that the worker always works at zero effort in period 1
because there is no benefit from doing otherwise. His choice for period zero is
either to work at zero effort or at effort equal to u because no intermediate
value affects his income. He chooses to work at u =u*if f
W1 -c(u*)+W0>(1—p)W1+W0
This condition and zero profits imply equation (5).
What are the implications of such a scheme for wage rigidity? First, this
scheme causes the age—earnings profile to deviate from the age—productivity
profile. cutput in period zero is Vu*, but W0 falls short of that. Qitput
in period 1 is zero, and q1 is necessarily positive. This does not imply,
however, that wages vary more over the life cycle as a result of such a
scheme. For example, if Vtl*> 2C(u*)/p,then it is possible to find an x >
0such that W0 =w1.Ifworkers were paid their exact output in each period,
the wage in period one would fall short of that in period zero •Theincentive.—7—
scheme would actually smooth earnings over the life cycle in an absolute sense.
How do the wages respond to business cycle fluctuations? The wage received
over the entire life cycle is Vu* so any permanent change in V is reflected
one—to—one in the lifetime wage. But this does not imply the same correspond-
ence in each of the two periods.
First, differentiation of W0 with respect to V yields
aw0/av =
u:
+ V u/aV -(C'(u)/p)(3u/V)
=u +Vau/Bv- (V/p)(au/v)
which is smaller than the right—hand side of (3a) because u*/V > 0. The
conclusion is that the wage in period zero does not move with the business cycle
by as much as it would if output were geared directly to productivity.
For period 1, there is no change in productivity, but there is a change in
the wage W1. Differentiation withrespect to V yields
=(C1(U
=(V/p)(3ulay) > 0
Although W1 more sensitive to changes in value of output than would be
warranted by productivity considerations, it is still true that in neither
period does the wage move as rapidly as the product price. This might give the
appearance of wage rigidity since no one worker's wage at any point in the life
cycle moves as rapidly as product price.
V.Relativecomparisons
More recent literature has discussed the role of relative comparisons in
providing incentives. Tournament—type labor contracts, where one worker com-
petes with another for a particular job that has a high wage, can induce workers
to behave appropriately and to select first best levels of effort.7
7See tazear and Rosen (1981), Holmstrom (1982), carmichael(1983), Green
and Stokey (1983), and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) for analyses of relative
compensation schemes.—8—
At this point, the variance of e in equation (1) can no longer be assumed
to be zero. The essence of contest—like labor contracts requires that there be
some random noise in the world. Without going into the details of the
tournament labor contract, the basic idea is this: Workers compete against one
another for a particular job that carries a specified wage. The individual who
has the highest level of output is given the job and is entitled to the wage
that goes along with it, irrespective of the output level. It turns out that in
competition, the equilibrium wage structure generates a first best solution,
with each worker putting out the efficient amount of effort. The spread between
the winner's wage and the loser's wage is the motivating factor.
If each individual draws an e in equation 1, then e -ej
defined as
z is distributed with density function g(z). If W1 is the wage that goes to
the winner and w2 is the wage that goes to the loser, then the equilibriumis8
a. W1 =(V)(u*+ 1/g(O))
(7)
b. W2 =(V)(u*—1/g(O))
First consider the wage variation relative to output variation. The
expected wage across the two individuals is Vu* and expected output from (1)
is also Vu*. However, no individual is paid the expected output. Individuals
are ex ante identical, yet with certainty they receive different wages. In an
ex post sense, output may have more or less variance across individuals than the
wages. Since q is a random variable, whereas W1 and W2 are fixed in
advance, whether actual q is more or less disperse than wages depends upon the
realization of the random variable z. Even the expectation of Vqj, given
that j is the winner, may be closer or further from Vu* than is the winner's
wage .Theconclusion is that the contest—type incentive structure adds variance
8See tazear and Rosen (1981).
9A simple example makes this clear. Suppose that e can take the
values a and —a only. Then z =aj—ajhas g(O) =1/2independent of—9—
in wages relative to the ex ante expected output, but may add or reduce variance
relative to ex post output.
Additionally, the winner's wage is more sensitive, while the loser's wage
is less sensitive, to changes in V than indicated by (3a). Differentiation of
(7) yields
w1/aV =U+ V j/T÷1/g(O)
and * *
= u+ V u /V -1/g(O)
The last term on the right—hand side distinguishes these expressions from (3a),
adding and subtracting wage flexibility, respectively. The reason is that
when V increases, a higher u is appropriate. That can only be motivated by
increasing the spread between W1 and w2. The first two terms onthe right—
hand side reflect the value of increased average productivity. The last term is
the effect of increasing the spread.
"Winners" are the individuals who have advanced further up the hierarchy.
This implies that salaries should be more volatile with output at higher job
levels than at lower job levels. It is surely true that executives' compensa-
tion is more likely to be contingent on the performance of the firm than middle
management's. Whether this relationship holds over the business cycle as well
can be discovered.
VI. Qnclusion
There exists no obvious link between wage rigidity and the provision of
incentives. &Dme incentive devices introduce additional wage variation into an
economy, but others, such as relative compensation schemes, can actually reduce
it, even when risk aversion is not an issue. The more specific conclusions are:
the value of a so W1 =Vu*+ 2V and W2 = - 2V.What is the expected
level of output, given that j has drawn e1 > ej?It is Vu + Va/2 which
can exceed or fall short of W1, depending on the value of a.—10--
1 •Piecerates increase cross sectional wage variation relative to a
straight salary, but piece rate compensation is not necessarily more flexible
over a business cycle than is a salary.
2. If output is not perfectly observed at zero cost, then some type of
sampling scheme may be used. One reasonable scheme adds cross—sectional
variation in wages. That same scheme makes some worker's wage rigid with
respect to the business cycle, and others overly sensitive to the business
cycle. But this is not a necessary consequence of imperfect observability.
Another efficient scheme adds no variation that would not be present were piece
rates and perfectly observed output to prevail.
3. Life cycle incentive devices steepen the age—earnings profile relative
to the age—productivity profile. However, this does not imply that wages are
more variable than productivity over the life cycle because the relative
steepening could actually flatten the wage path. What is true, however, is that
the annual wage is never as flexible with respect to the business cycle as are
product prices.
4. Incentive schemes that involve relative comparisons, and in particular,
tournament—style labor contracts, add wage variation relative to expected
output. &ich schemes do not unambiguously increase wage variation relative to
realized output. n implication of this incentive scheme is that wages at the
top of the hierarchy are more sensitive to changes in the value of output than
wages at the bottom of the hierarchy.
Researchers who have conjectured that the provision of incentives can
change the amount of wage flexibility in an economy are quite correct.
Unfortunately, the direction of the change is not unambiguous. Those seeking to
explain international or intertemporal differences in wage rigidity are not
likely to find the answer in the incentive structure.—1 1—
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